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“Where there is no vision, the people perish”
Proverbs 29:18
“Vision without action is a daydream.   
Action without vision is a nightmare”
Japanese Proverb
“As long as Haitians’ Number One Dream  
is “a visa and leave”, no effective recovery  
is possible”                
José  Magloire van der Vossen
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1.  CONTEXT 
This report emerges from Ian Davis’s visit to Haiti in November 2011, to examine progress 
with reconstruction approximately twenty-two months after the earthquake.  His visit only 
lasted three weeks, but his reflections relate to almost 40 years of work, as an architect, 
academic and consultant examining, researching and writing about post-disaster sheltering and 
housing in about 30 different recovery situations.  During his visit he was able to visit various 
sites and interview a spectrum of informants that included NGO, UN and Government officials 
as well as earthquake survivors, consultants, private sector representatives and academics. Ian 
Davis’s findings are totally independent viewpoints since he was not employed by any agency 
operating in Haiti.
This is a summary of a longer, fully illustrated report with relevant historical examples. This can 
be downloaded from www.onuhabitat.org/haiti 
The author gratefully acknowledges all who generously gave their time and valued insights to 
this report.  A list of contributors is included in the full report. In order to expand the author’s 
limited perceptions of reconstruction and specifically of the Haiti context, he asked four 
colleagues with extensive experience of the Haiti Reconstruction (Anshu Sharma, Jo da Silva,  
Maggie Stephenson and José Magloire-van der Vossen) for their own priority list of ‘actions 
needed’.  Their rich insights were gratefully received and are reproduced in full in the Appendix 
of the main report, and they have also been fragmented and placed within section 6 under 
appropriate proposed actions.   The draft of this summary was helpfully reviewed by members 
of the E-Shelter/ CCCM Cluster and some of their reactions have been quoted in the text.
Special thanks are also due to Conor Gallagher for professional support in the design of the 
summary and the main report. 
2.  RECOVERY AIMS IN HAITI 
The history of disaster reconstruction is a gallery of frequent failures and rare success stories.  
Recovery fits into four broad categories: Scenario 1 being the worst solution, while Scenario 4 is 
clearly the target to aim for: 
s IN Scenario 1, there are numerous examples of no recovery, where years after the disaster, 
there is still abundant evidence of ruined buildings, half finished projects and the failure to 
deliver the early promises; 
s IN Scenario 2, there are examples of insufficient or erratic recovery, where buildings 
may have been rebuilt, but there are not enough jobs, society remains fragmented and trees 
have not been replanted; 
s IN Scenario 3, – the ‘status-quo’ option, there are examples of attempts to recover the pre-
disaster situation, but alas, that ‘normality’ was also the ‘vulnerability’ that gave rise to the 
disaster…;
s BUT IN Scenario 4, there are rare examples of recovery where positive development has 
taken place to produce a better and safer environment. 
 In the following diagram four key elements are noted in this scenario: 
 -  Build back both better and safer
 -  Complete all sectors
 -  Inspired  Vision
 -  Strong, persistent and wise leadership
   
This scenario must be the only aim and vision for Haiti’s Recovery Plans.
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These stages can be seen on the following model, where recovery has been broken down into its 
four essential strands: vision and leadership, resources, participation and ownership and organisation.
 
SCENARIO 1
NO 
RECOVERY
DISASTER
Progress with Recovery  (with thanks to Professor David Alexander for his partnership in developing this model)
Time
Halted progress
Expiry of political
will and money
International agency
fatigue
No vision
No leadership
SCENARIO 2
INSUFFICIENT 
RECOVERY
Incomplete
Unsafe
Low-quality
Limited vision
Slim leadership Build back the vulnerable 
‘status quo’
Wrong vision
Ill informed
leadership
Build back both
better and safer
Complete all sectors
Inspired vision
Strong, persistant &
wise leadership
SCENARIO 4
DEVELOPMENT
RECOVERY
SCENARIO 3
REPLACEMENT
RECOVERY
 
 This model of Disaster Recovery can be expanded in scope to break the process down into five 
sectors:  
s PSYCHOSOCIAL RECOVERY
s ENVIRONMENTAL RECOVERY
s INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNMENTAL RECOVERY
s PHYSICAL RECOVERY
s ECONOMIC LIVELIHOOD RECOVERY  
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 Since each of these sectors is dependent on the others - needing close integration, the aim must 
be to move each sector, in a balanced manner, towards Scenario 4  ‘Development Recovery’.  
Close multi-sectoral integration must be the only way forward for Haiti’s Recovery Plans to 
avoid the risk of neglecting one sector at the expense of another.
 Thus the underlying assumption of my report is that full ‘development recovery’ is 
needed in Haiti that moves beyond replicating the dangerous pre-disaster status-quo 
and that this recovery integrates all the key sectors in a balanced approach through an 
agreed policy framework. 
3.  POSITIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE HAITI RECOVERY
3.1   Immediately after the earthquake, excellent support was extended to survivors by ‘host 
families’.  This reduced the burden on authorities and provided essential security to 
traumatized families. 
3.2   The survivors are highly motivated in their reaction to occupy vacant lands in spontaneously 
created camps.  In the way they have survived in these makeshift settlements they have 
demonstrated well developed improvisation skills in building, communal living and general 
survival.
3.3   External Global Solidarity has been expressed through massive bilateral support from 140 
countries, (out of a global total of 196) and through generous remittances from the Haitian 
diaspora of about 3.5 million people.
3.4   Private Sector Support to reconstruction has been strong, with exceptional support from 
DIGICEL in rebuilding the Iron Market as well as for the reconstruction of schools and 
infrastructure. The rapid reconstruction of the much loved Iron Market fulfilled a vital practical 
function, but it was also an inspired symbolic act in giving hope to the population that the 
downtown area of their city would be rebuilt.
3.5   International NGO Support was still present after 22 months.  In many contexts there would 
be minimal presence of NGO’s at this stage. 
3.6   Despite initial fears that this would impede reconstruction, earthquake rubble clearance 
appears to be progressing well, with delivery to sites that will not become unsafe new building 
sites with unconsolidated soils.  The recycling of rubble to form new concrete blocks was a 
sensible labour intensive move, even though it is of doubtful whether such blocks end up being 
cheaper to manufacture than newly produced blocks.
3.7   The repair strategy has been a key approach in preventing the wasteful demolition of houses 
that are repairable, although it was evidently late in starting.
3.8   The housing expo of prototype designs was an excellent way to enable the housing/ shelter 
private sector to display their wares in a comparative setting.
3.9   Communication strategies have been effective during the relief phase and will be increasingly 
important during reconstruction.
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4.  MIXED POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE 
HAITI RECOVERY 
4.1  Land invasions in Canaan indicate enterprise, and must be regarded as an asset in reducing 
the population pressure on the congested urban centre and through the gradual establishment 
of micro-enterprises such as concrete block-making, car repairs, tailoring, laundry services etc. 
But there is a negative side since most houses, set in unplanned settlements, have been built 
with a lack of quality construction, and many were not built safely.
4.2   The scale and nature of Community Level Actions are most impressive. The mapping 
exercises as well as the community enumeration processes pave the way for vital subsequent 
neighbourhood upgrading programmes.  
 But negative concerns relate to the inexperienced persons who are undertaking some of 
these exercises as well as the serious risk of raising community expectations to address the 
priorities that communities have identified through these studies, since there is no certainty of 
implementation given the absence of allocated funds.  However, some of the issues identified 
can be undertaken at low or no cost by the communities themselves.
4.3   The joint Habitat for Humanity and HAVEN two week house building initiative in 
Leogane in November 2011, that involved the active involvement of Jimmy Carter (aged 87) 
and his wife Rosalind was of mixed value.  Positively it involved ‘community to community’ 
volunteer assistance on a heroic scale and there is no reason to doubt that the Carters’ 
contribution to the building work was a sincere gesture of support
 But negatively, the project was very expensive, and gained wide publicity that was misleading.  
This relates to the suggestion to the armies of volunteers as well as their supporters in Europe 
and the US, that this is the best way to reconstruct, when clearly far better ‘user-build’ 
alternatives are available.  There was also the criticism that bringing in planeloads of volunteers 
from Ireland and the USA, for just one week of building and exposure to Haiti’s plight was a 
superficial form of ‘poverty and disaster tourism’.
4.4   The presence of young international staff in NGO and UN projects presents a mixed 
blessing.  Positively such young persons are enthusiastic, energetic, learn fast and engage easily 
with the predominant local population of young people and children.  
 But, many I met clearly lack previous exposure to a developing country and lacked an 
understanding of disaster or development practice. Some also lacked essential qualifications 
and experience and remain for inefficiently short periods.  Thus, the risk is that many are 
making decisions far beyond their capacity or competency.   One way forward is for better staff 
selection, induction training as well as ‘on-the-job’ training, perhaps undertaken on a joint 
inter-agency basis.
4.5   At the project level, coordination appeared to be working well when several agencies 
collaborated on the same integrated project.  But there is serious criticism of a lack of coherent 
well coordinated donor activity.  There a was also repeated criticism of the Government of 
Haiti for failing to get a tight grip on recovery activities.  But this may be changing (see item 
6.1).
4.6   The 16/6 neighbourhood return policy has the positive value of seeking to rehabilitate 
existing settlements rather than attempt unrealistic relocation projects that have occurred with 
dire negative consequences in many disaster recovery situations.  The underlying intention to 
symbolically clear key public spaces to provide hope and confidence to the population is also an 
excellent idea.
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 But, there are unresolved negative risks implicit in the programme.  Given the high proportion 
of renters who are to be relocated to their original locations, there is a clear need to rapidly 
regenerate a large stock of affordable rental accommodation, ranging from a single room to 
a full dwelling, and at present that does not appear to exist.  In addition the programme for 
the selected camps will not be replicable to all sites since at present there is insufficient capital 
available.
5.  NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE HAITI RECOVERY
5.1   There appears to be a vacuum in the Government concerning leadership, strategic 
management, policy directives, co-ordination of actions concerned with permanent 
housing reconstruction.
 To emphasise this gap I quote from a pungent critique of inaction by the GoH as well as the 
international community. An experienced informant notes the: 
 
 “……damaging effects on progress of the lack of a reconstruction policy and strategy and thus 
to hold those who have failed Haiti accountable.  No agreement has been reached up to today 
(January 18th  2012) on size, possible designs, costs, and detailed methodology (installments: how 
many? supervision? by whom?) of P-Housing reconstruction.  
 No policy on who is entitled to a permanent house has also been established. Also, no overall 
estimation of the needs, costing and timing of the reconstruction process, study on the availability of 
SKILLEDUNSKILLED HUMAN RESOURCES AND MATERIALS AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN
 Additionally, no clear understanding of how much money has actually been set aside for 
reconstruction has been reached. The GoH has repeatedly asked for support to develop these 
PARAMETERSCAST LIGHT ON THIS INFORMATION "UT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS SO FAR FAILED TO
deliver on these requests. Donors have not invested in P-Housing reconstruction mostly due to the 
above mentioned lack of clarity in the approach”. 
%3HELTER###- #LUSTER MEMBERS COMMENTSFEEDBACK
5.2   While the creation of over 100,000 T-Shelters has provided much better accommodation 
than improvised tent structures, the results have been mainly negative, for five reasons:
1. They have absorbed approximately $500 million USD1.  This vast sum could have been far 
better used to build permanent dwellings.  They could have been built for little more money 
than T-Shelters (average costs of T-Shelters: $138.8 USD per sq m compared to average costs of 
permanent dwellings $166.00 USD per sq m (HAVEN).  
 
 However, the World Bank (PREKAD) and the Bureau of Monetisation are anticipating the cost of 
permanent dwellings to total $7,000 per unit of 18 sq.m or $388 USD per sq m.
1  “An enormous sum has been spent on temporary housing (easily $500 million when all is completed), which has gone largely 
to existing landowners in non-urban settings. A conservative estimate is that reconstruction could cost $1.6 billion. Less than $400 million 
is now available, and it is committed to a disproportionately small number of beneficiaries. More funding is needed, but it should be 
allocated more equitably and spent more efficiently.”   
Priscilla Phelps (2011) Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report  Item 4 
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Figs. 9 & 10.  Transitional Shelters in Port-au-Prince.  Note- in the right hand picture the T-Shelter has been constructed inside 
partially constructed permanent dwelling, enclosing rubble from the original demolished house.  (Credit: Ian Davis)
2. They frequently occupy land in densely populated urban that is needed for dwelling 
reconstruction, thus blocking the construction of permanent reconstruction.
3. They are not easily demolished to be recycled into permanent dwellings. (This is on account 
of the lightweight timber technology of  T-Shelters in comparison with the heavy concrete 
block infill within reinforced concrete frame construction of permanent houses). 
4. If international experience is anything to go by, these shelters will not be demolished, rather 
they will remain as sub-standard dwellings for years to come as a dismal legacy.  
5. They failed to generate extensive much needed local employment. I did not hear of any skill 
training attached to construction programmes of T-Shelters.
 Figs. 11 & 12.  Left:  Transition Shelter donated by the IFRC in Delmas 9 in Port-au-Prince . The photograph was taken in 
November 2011, 21 months after the earthquake.  The family of six sleep in a space of 18 sq metres.  They complained about the 
lack of space, the lack of security from theft and the heat from the CI roofing that they have tried to reduce by hanging sheets 
below the  metal sheeting.  They also find the shelter very noisy when there is heavy rainfall.  (Credit: Ian Davis)
Right: Permanent House in Cabaret by HAVEN.  Note the temporary timber roof that the owner will probably replace with a 
concrete slab when resources become available in order to build a second floor  (Credit: Maggie Stephenson)
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The following pair of scenarios indicate alternative recovery options.  Scenario 1 has been the 
prevailing pattern adopted in Haiti.
 
 
 
 Response to the above five point critique of T-Shelters from the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster:
 “The idea that T-Shelter is a physical obstacle to construction is ludicrous. Not only there exist many 
examples of the transformation of the timber frame into (part of the) permanent construction (not 
furniture) but there are vast areas damaged where the coverage with T-Shelter is minimal or non-
existing. Coordination on permanent housing programming which has been very poor throughout 
the response, would ensure that those areas with no coverage would be served with permanent 
housing.  There are many areas which can be served still by T-Shelter and permanent programming 
without conflicts.” 
%3HELTER###- #LUSTER MEMBERS COMMENTSFEEDBACK
5.3  Three important safety concerns emerged during my visit:
1. Individual engineers, employed by NGO’s  appear to be checking repairs and reconstruction 
projects for seismic safety.  However, given the scale of building repairs/ retrofit or 
reconstruction, the limited numbers of qualified engineers will not be able to respond to the 
potential massive demand for such advice.  Therefore, engineers need to apply a strategic 
‘cascade approach’ to teach a community  the principles and practice of  ‘seismic safety 
compliance’.
2. Retrofitting is more appropriate for critical facilities than individual dwellings.  Thus, 
schools/ churches – buildings of multiple assembly are appropriate as they demand enhanced 
protection.
3. When agencies are assigned individual neighbourhoods for upgrading, overall safety should 
be a key part of their mandate- so that they check all structures, and offer training to all local 
builders, masons etc in safe construction.
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5.4   The evictions of camp dwellers have caused acute hardship to surviving families who have 
already suffered enough over the past two years. I am informed that according to the latest 
eviction report (November 2011), a total of 63,109 people living in camps have been evicted 
since July 2010. An additional 99,098 are currently facing threats of eviction. Overall this figure 
represents 19% of current IDPs.  Evictions remain for almost one out of five IDPs a daily 
threat. 
5.5   The relocation of surviving families to the only ‘official’ disaster relief camp in Corail, 
is generally acknowledged as an ill-considered decision.  There appear to be a host of problems 
with Corail:
s 4HE UPROOTING OF THE OCCUPANTS TO MOVE THEM TO THIS SITE
s 4HE HIGHLY EXPOSED SITE WITHOUT SHADE AND A LONG DISTANT FROM MOST RESIDENTS WORK PLACE IN
Port-au-Prince 
s 4HE UNIMAGINATIVE REGIMENTED MILITARY STYLE LAYOUT
s 4HE INADEQUATE DESIGN OF THE 43HELTERS
s 4HE LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEPENDENCY OF SERVICES TO MAINTAIN WATER AND SANITATION
s $ISSATISFACTION OF THE SETTLEMENT BY THE OCCUPANTS
s 4HE LACK OF ANY PLAN FOR ITS FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
6.  ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROMOTE FULL RECOVERY2
6.1   ESTABLISHING, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, EFFECTIVE  MANAGEMENT AND 
LEADERSHIP OF RECONSTRUCTION WITHIN GOVERNMENT
 The closure of the Haiti Interim Recovery Housing Sector on October 24 2011 was a major 
source of concern. The perceptive Background Report on Perceptions of Recovery Priorities 
by Priscilla Phelps, (See Appendix 2 of Main Paper) indicates six key issues that urgently need 
to be addressed.  I trust that the commission’s existence and mandate will be renewed, or be 
replaced by a similar body since it is crucial that all sectors of disaster recovery/ reconstruction 
need a focal point at the centre of the Government of Haiti to give direction and coordinate 
these complex tasks.
 However, as I write there are encouraging signs that the Government of Haiti is beginning to 
move forward, since in January 2012 the Haitian Government’s Ministry of Public Works is 
now working closely with the Unit for Reconstruction, UCLBP that is well placed under the 
Prime Ministers Office.   It is to be hoped that the main donors will support the Government 
as it lays down the foundations of a reconstruction management structure to establish 
governmental machinery that can supervise the varied sectors of reconstruction. 
 Accountable management and leadership are essential, but a clear vision for recovery is also 
needed with ‘champions’ who will inspire the entire process, work through the host of obstacles 
and provide the public and all the assisting groups with direction and confidence.
 The coordination model for recovery needs to be one with multiple linked nodes in a devolved 
model, (rather like a network of wire netting) rather than a centralized, cumbersome and 
unwieldy ‘command and control’ model (rather like a bicycle wheel with all spokes leading to a 
 central hub).
2 After each proposed action, a series of quotes are inserted in italics. These come from experienced informants with experi-
ence of Haiti who were approached to seek their own proposals for recovery, and expand my own perceptions.  Their suggestions are 
included in full within the Appendix 1. of the Main Report
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 “Change- 
 is possible and recovery is a challenge for those who remain flexible and positive so keep trying
 José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response 
 “Lack of  Vision at the Micro-level”
 In the absence of credible master planning processes, the best option available is perhaps the creation 
of smaller plans wherever work is being carried out, and then stitching them together.  Unfortunately, 
comprehensive visions were not easily found even at this small scale.”
Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant
 “Lack of Vision and Leadership:
 Re-construction relies on the cumulative and collective action by a wide range of actors (various 
government departments, UN, NGO’s, local institutions, civil society). They need to unite behind a 
clear and realistic vision of what reconstruction can achieve set out by the GoH. A vision statement 
is necessarily high level, and is more useful if supported by more specific goals (or objectives). Both 
could be developed quite quickly through a professional facilitated 1-2 day workshop involving key 
stakeholders.  The greater challenge perhaps is who should participate in that workshop, and who 
comprises the leadership group (or individual) who will take ownership of the vision and goals, 
and has the mandate to develop a strategy that responds to this. A government entity needs to be 
established urgently to take on the leadership and co-ordination of reconstruction. A key question is 
whether this should integral to government or a more distinct entity. Secondly, how this entity will be 
effectively supported by the UN and other international organisations”.
                                                                  Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup
 “Strategy for co-ordination and integration: 
 A strategy is critical to achieve co-ordinated effort and action, and ensure that the whole is greater 
than the sum of the parts, and that opportunities are not overlooked.  At present, a key challenge is 
that those contributing to reconstruction are doing so in isolation. The limited successes to date tend to 
be one-off, one-time projects in more rural areas where integrated approach is less critical”. 
Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup
 “One overall plan:
  All support from local and international organisations should fit in one overall plan to build back 
better”
                                      José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response 
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.2 MOBILISING NATIONAL RESOURCES
 Given the massive challenge of reconstruction that will take many years to accomplish, support 
from the full range of civil society is essential.  The government will need to find appropriate 
ways to engage with locally based bodies that will include institutions/ academic courses in 
reconstruction and virtually all aspects of society: FOR EXAMPLE ARCHITECTURE PLANNING ENGINEERING 
lNANCE LEGAL RELIGIOUS BODIES CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE PRIVATE SECTOR MEDIA ETC
h#ONSIDER ISSUES OF EQUITY
 The resources available, both financial and technical, have to date been allocated on a quite ad hoc 
project-based logic. Some areas, communities and families have won the recovery lottery with high 
levels of support, and others have been less lucky.  
 The Government of Haiti needs to ensure the distribution of assistance is more balanced, more fair, 
and more accountable. Likewise the assistance community needs to coordinate and support the 
Government in managing the optimisation of resources”. 
Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti
 
  SUMMARY PAPER: WHAT IS THE VISION FOR SHELTERING AND HOUSING IN HAITI? 11
 “ Funding/Costs: 
 Funding is limited and there needs to be greater transparency as to how much is available and what 
is being budgeted and who holds the purse strings.  Expenditure needs to be perceived as investment 
RATHER THAN AIDCOMPENSATION BASED ON AT LEAST A QUALITATIVE COSTBENElT ANALYSIS 4HIS APPROACH
might have prevented so many T-Shelters being built!). The cost of technical expertise is currently 
perceived as expensive as it is related to the capital costs of ‘a project’ (eg. a school, a house); in fact 
investing £50k in developing a safe school design or retrofitting guidelines is trivial when 100s of 
schools are being built and houses retro-fitted.  Without it, the larger investment in building structures 
may be wasted if they collapse in a future event.”
                                                                  Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
 “Partnerships: 
 The complexity of the challenges in Haiti requires unified effort by diverse organisations. Cross-
sectoral partnerships are a proven mechanism for combining the strengths of different entities, but 
are only effective if there is a shared goal and governance amongst the parties which promotes trust 
and collaboration. Public procurement processes are an obstacle to this approach as they stipulate 
a ‘consultant’, a ‘firm’ or a ‘consortium’; and often focus at transferring risk to others rather than 
combining strengths to solve a problem”.                                                                   
Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors 
s 7ILL REQUIRE THE FULL RESOURCES OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO BE MOBILISED
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.3 MANAGING THE EXPECTATIONS  OF SURVIVORS
 Evidently there is a widespread expectation among the survivors that they will each be provided 
with a new house (see Haiti Interim Housing Sector Report , item 3 in the Appendix of the Main 
Report).  Therefore, the government must dispel such assumptions and explain their overall 
policy for the future of homeless families.
 
 “Develop an Effective Communication Strategy: 
 This is needed to project the vision, publicise emerging policy and place GoH in the driving seat. The 
current expectation that everyone will be provided a home needs to be dispelled, and the GoH need to 
re-position themselves as a facilitator of recovery rather than a provider. There needs to be a marked 
threshold between the last two years of ‘aid’ and the next period of reconstruction.” 
Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
s 7ILL NOT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE FURTHER lNANCIAL INVESTMENT
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI AND )/-
6.4 DEFINING HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION POLICY
 The government need to urgently define the ‘rule-book’ for housing reconstruction to avoid 
different standards being adopted in a piece-meal manner.  Facing such key questions as: what 
to build, where, when, how safe, how large, for whom and at what costing level?
 “ Lack of Reconstruction Strategy:
 A strategy simply sets out the big picture in terms of what needs to be done, and the inter-relationships 
(dependencies) between different elements. Policies can then be developed which relate to specific 
aspects of the strategy (eg. land tenure, T-Shelters, compensation etc)”
                                                      Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
 “Think like investors: 
 How can programmes and activities be more strategic, more efficient, more effective and provide better 
value for money. How might we leverage multiple impacts and outcomes from resources invested in 
reconstruction, (invest in training people, invest in strengthening institutions). How will our actions 
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now, supporting reconstruction, ensure Haiti is safer in 20 years time, or otherwise contribute to long 
term development”
Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti
 “ Infrastructure 
 There is too much focus on housing and not enough on infrastructure. This is an important element 
to improve quality of life in Port-au-Prince and it much easier and more cost effective to introduce 
now as part of reconstruction than integrate it into a pre-existing urban fabric. Investment in such 
public services provides confidence and motivation for families to invest themselves in re-building 
or repairing their houses. It is suggested that priority should be given to developing drainage, road, 
sewage and potable water networks followed by power, telcomms, and solid waste management”
 Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
 
 “ Focus
 mostly on rural support, facilitate good basic infrastructure to attract occupants from the Port au 
Prince area.                                                      
 José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response
 “Neighbourhood Masterplans:
 These need to be developed by experienced urban planners in consultation with those living there as 
well as the government, and specific action plans developed. International technical support is needed 
but could be done cost effectively thorough workshops and mentoring which supports and builds the 
CAPACITY OF LOCAL PLANNERSENGINEERSARCHITECTS 7E ENVISION A CENTRAL PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT OFlCE
WOULD ACT AS A RESOURCE CENTRE PROVIDING A CENTRE OF EXCELLENCEKNOWLEDGEADVICE )N THIS WAY THE
learning from the upgrading of one neighbourhood would feed into the next.” 
  Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI AND THE $EPARTMENT OF 0UBLIC7ORKS
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
6.5 ADVISING ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSITION SHELTERS
 There is a strong case to cease building T-Shelters immediately, and using remaining available 
funds for permanent dwelling reconstruction.  Advice needs to be provided to the occupants of 
T-Shelters concerning their rights to demolish or modify/ upgrade them into permanent houses, 
or how they demolish and recycle the building materials to enable them to build permanent 
dwellings on the T-Shelter sites.
 “ T-Shelter Policy
 !DVICE IS NEEDED ON THE STATUS OF 43HELTERS AND WHETHER THE OCCUPANTS ARE PERMITTED TO REUSERECYCLE
materials; or improve their shelters in-situ.  We caution against the notion of ‘upgrading’ to a ‘permanent 
house’ without there being a clear definition of the latter.  We note also the inherent conflict between the 
aspiration for a durable masonry house which unless build correctly is likely to be unsafe in earthquakes, 
and a lightweight T-Shelter (which is vulnerable to hurricanes)”.
 Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
s 7ILL NOT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE FURTHER lNANCIAL INVESTMENT
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
 
6.6 SUPPORTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY
 A policy is needed to use local materials and labour wherever possible in reconstruction.   
In addition, a policy and programme is also needed to enable survivors to secure sustainable 
livelihoods that can assist them in financing their own recovery.  The development of micro-
credit facilities and small loans to business enterprises will be a pre-requisite to economic 
recovery at the neighbourhood level.
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 “Local Capacity: 
 The lack of local skills ranging from skilled tradesman to engineers and project managers is a 
critical issue. At the same time the greatest opportunity reconstruction affords is to build this 
capacity in-country.  The starting point is a comprehensive assessment of the capacity in Haiti and 
targeted training programmes.  A key challenge at present is that most of the NGO’s implementing 
PROGRAMMES IN (AITI ALSO SUFFER FROM LIMITED TECHNICAL AND PROGRAMPROJECT MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
New partnerships are needed (probably with the private sector) to develop and deliver training 
materials, and construction of public buildings should be used as opportunities to demonstrate best 
practice”.
 Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
s 7ILL BENElT FROM TECHNICAL SUPPORT FROM ),/ AND )NTERNATIONAL &INANCE
Institutions
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.7 SECURING LEGAL TENURE 
 Building from the community enumeration work, for the government to provide legal tenure 
title deeds for the owners of individual land and dwellings. Building from the community 
enumeration work, the government needs to grasp the opportunity to provide legal tenure...
       
 “Land Tenure/Certification
 Those agencies (eg. Haven) who have built ‘permanent’ houses have only managed to do so because 
they acquired land. ‘Why has a land-titling programme to provide a legal basis for community-driven 
land adjudication not been established? Is individual land titling appropriate in Haiti given the 
DENSITY NUMBERS OF RENTERSSQUATTERS MULTIPLE OCCUPANCY HOUSEHOLDS IN 0O0 3INCE THERE IS A TENDENCY
for the most poor and vulnerable to be excluded, is community level land certification a possibility?”
Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
 “The government 
 should effectively reinforce the registration of land ownership, and ensure that this ownership is 
respected”
                                       José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response 
s 7ILL REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
s 7ILL REQUIRE FURTHER lNANCIAL INVESTMENT
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.8 BUILDING PUBLIC SAFETY AND CREATING SAFE CRITICAL FACILITIES
 The aim is to provide protection from threats to lives, livelihoods and property (Natural 
disasters such as hurricanes/ landslides/ flooding and earthquakes) and giving priority attention 
to the reconstruction and protection of all critical facilities in each neighbourhood. These could 
include all buildings of multiple occupancy such as schools/ churches/ cinemas/ government 
buildings as well as basic water/ electricity/ telephone services.
 “Safe Construction:
 I see as the greatest challenges to effective recovery in Haiti to teach owners and construction workers 
the practical highlights of safe construction (knowledge and practice!)”
 “There has been talk of improving technical competence in the areas of architecture and engineering, 
and of improving the codal provisions for structures.  I felt that raising awareness of home owners and 
training of masons will bring more benefits.  The only credible mason training initiative I found when 
I was in Haiti was one that had been in the planning pipeline for months, and was to be carried out 
by American consultants, targeting 25 masons for a one day training.  The plan left me depressed”. 
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 “Perceptions are a major issue - both at community level, and as understood by agencies.  While a 
number of local house-owners are rebuilding vulnerabilities in the absence of any opportunities, I 
also took a number of pictures of INGO managed reconstruction projects that were hugely over-
engineered”. 
 “Retrofitting is still not being talked about - perhaps it is too big a luxury in the present context?”
Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant
                                                                             
 Compliance with Regulations:
 “The government should assure that construction rules and regulations are respected and that  
contravenors are punished”.
José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response 
 Rebuilding Vulnerability:  
 “The reconstruction of Haiti is likely to take 8 to 10 years (PDNA). The cluster understands that 
there is a high probability for hurricane or important rainy season in the region in the next few years.
 The cluster is also extremely concerned about the vulnerability of Haitians to further earthquakes, 
INCLUDING FAMILIES NOT INCLUDING OF FAMILIES WHO HAVE RETURNED TO UNSAFE BUILDINGS 4HE CLUSTER IS
also concerned over the families who have repaired or reconstructed their homes without adequate 
technical advice or support.  In this context, the Cluster has prioritised shelter and camp support 
which offers protection against next potential disasters.”
%3HELTER###- #LUSTER MEMBERS COMMENTSFEEDBACK
 “Damage Assessment and Safety:
 Kubilay Hicyilmaz (Arup) spent several weeks in Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake, and expressed two key reservations about the approach to damage assessment, which 
remain a challenge. 
 1. It is not clear to occupants (or others) that the red-amber-green classification relates to the 
condition of the building in relation to its pre-earthquake state ie. is it habitable now? not is it safe? 
Many buildings classified as green are unsafe either due to a brittle structure or because they are 
located on land prone to flooding, for example. 
 2. The FEMA assessment method followed was developed in the US.  There, it links to a follow up 
process for support, advice, compensation. In Haiti it was done in isolation.  There is still a vacuum in 
terms of policy for damaged houses, as well as know-how on how to retro-fit houses.” 
                                                                   
 “ Post-Tsunami there was considerable debate over the phrase ‘build back better’ and whether it 
was synonymous with  ‘building back safer’ as you have used it here.  Safe construction is critical 
in reducing exposure to natural hazards, and I fully support unpacking this to include design, 
workmanship and siting.  However, building back better surely also entails improvements to basic 
SERVICES CREATING MORE JOBS AND CONSERVATIONENHANCEMENT OF NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS WHICH HAVE A
significant impact on building resilience.”
                                                                 Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
s 7ILL REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN SAFETY DEMANDS PRIORITY ATTENTION TO
avoid rebuilding vulnerability)
s 7ILL REQUIRE FURTHER lNANCIAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.9   RECOGNISING THAT TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES DECISIONS ON 
RECONSTRUCTION MUST INVOLVE THE SURVIVORS 
 In the words of the GFDRR Reconstruction Guidelines:  
 “…empowering communities to carry out reconstruction allows their members to realize their 
aspirations and contribute their knowledge and skills.  It also assist their psycho-social recovery, helps 
establish community cohesion, and increases the likelihood of satisfaction with the results”
GFDRR (2010) ‘Safer Homes, Stronger Communities’ Guiding Principle 3 page 1 
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 “Community Responsibility:
 Rebuilding is more than construction, it is a mindshift for the better.  Create awareness at community 
level that earthquakes are a reality and that rebuilding is the responsibility of each community 
member at all levels. ‘No growth without ownership’.”
José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response 
 
h'ET THE MONEY TO THE GROUND
 There is not enough money available for reconstruction or to address many other basic needs. Haiti 
more than most disaster affected countries cannot afford to spend remaining funds on poorly justified 
projects, or in high overheads.  A higher proportion of funds needs to reach more affected people more 
directly, and allow them to decide how it is used to address needs they prioritise themselves.” 
  Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti 
 “ The point made above - ‘Get the money to the ground’ is vital. I worry that we talk about 
reconstruction with too much emphasis on the physical and not enough on the economy, on what is 
needed to catalyse the economy and household level investment. Your models at the start of the paper 
recognise this, and the rebuilding of rebuilding of the Iron Market was a positive step but this could 
perhaps be emphasised more”.
                                                                  Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup. 
  
s 7ILL REQUIRE THE FULL RESOURCES OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO BE MOBILISED
s 7ILL REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF .'/S AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.10  SUPPORTING OWNER-DRIVEN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND AN 
ASSOCIATED PROGRAMME TO DEVELOP BUILDING SKILLS.  
 Owner–driven housing has many advantages over private sector driven housing in 
reconstruction. This approach is particularly appropriate for Haiti in view of the massive 
housing need.  A key component of these programmes is the development of useful building 
skills, with the ability to build safe quality dwellings and the capacity to market such skills after 
reconstruction is complete. 
 In January 2012 the Ministry of Works of the Government of Haiti launched a Communication 
Strategy.  This is a comprehensive approach to the training of engineers, families, builders, 
masons etc. in safer construction. Of all the positive indications of progress I observed, this key 
initiative is a most encouraging sign that the Government, as well as other concerned parties are 
taking safe reconstruction seriously, and are using training and capacity building as the means 
to achieve this aim. 
   “Facilitate home owner-driven reconstruction”                       Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
s 7ILL BENElT FROM TECHNICAL SUPPORT FROM 5.(!")4!4 AND )NTERNATIONAL &INANCE
Institutions
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.11  FACILITATING THE BUILDING OF RENTAL HOUSING 
 In order to clear the camps it is essential for there to be a ‘pull factor’ that will encourage the 
estimated 78% occupants who were formally renters of dwellings to move back into safe new 
multi-family rentable housing in their original neighbourhoods.  Initially financial support will 
be needed to enable occupants to pay their rent.
 “ Projects that have funding and are advancing are not replicable; some housing solutions most 
needed are not being addressed..……Reconstruction of multifamily rental housing is critical and a 
separate initiative is needed to target this part of the housing market.”
Priscilla Phelps (2011) 
Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report Item 2 
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s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
s 7ILL BENElT FROM TECHNICAL SUPPORT FROM 5.(!")4!4 AND )NTERNATIONAL &INANCE
Institutions
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
6.12 PROMOTING URBAN PLANNING AND URBAN IMPROVEMENT
 Within each congested low-income settlements there is a need to develop a well integrated 
reconstruction strategy. This will need to include:
s 2UBBLE CLEARANCE
s #OMMUNITY ENUMERATION TO CLARIFY LEGAL TITLES TO PROPERTY
s #OMMUNITY MAPPING OF CAPACITIES AND GAPS
s 5RBAN 0LANNING
s 2ISK ASSESSMENT
s %NVIRONMENTAL UPGRADING
s )DENTIFYING SAFE ACCESS ROUTES
s 7ATER SANITATION ELECTRICAL AND TELEPHONE SERVICES
s 7ASTE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL
s "AN ON PLASTIC BAGS THAT BLOCK CULVERTS AND CAUSE LOCALIZED mOODING
s ,OCAL mOOD PROTECTION MEASURES TO RAVINES AND WATER COURSES
                
 “ Regenerate the city centre: 
 The heart of Port Au Prince was already run down before the earthquake, with many unused 
buildings and empty plots. There is a risk that the earthquake damage will accelerate this 
degeneration process, and along with it, the expansion of the city and alternative areas of growth in 
the suburbs, with implications for infrastructure and transport. This would be a ‘lose lose scenario’, 
including the loss of identity of the capital of the country. 
 The city centre is strategically located with good potential for livelihoods. The clearance of sites since 
2010 provides new scope for redevelopment. It could accommodate several times more people than it 
currently does and particularly low income rental households. This could be a win win scenario.   
 The regeneration of the city centre needs a vision. It needs to be inclusive, feasible and timely to become 
a reality. This is a political, economic, social and environmental opportunity not to be missed”. 
Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti 
h 5RBAN #ONTEXT
 4HE URBAN ENVIRONMENT IN 0O0 IS HUGELY VARIED AS OUR ANALYSIS AND CLASSIlCATION OF THE  SITES
shows. Reconstruction provides a unique window of opportunity for providing services, improving 
drainage, demarking open-spaces, densification, as well improved quality of housing. The terminology 
of reconstruction and ‘permanent houses’ needs to be replaced by an emphasis on neighbourhood 
renewal and upgrading (which might have a rural parallel in village renewal and upgrading as 
DISTINCT FROM RESETTLEMENT OR NEWTOWNVILLAGE CONSTRUCTION	v
                                                                    Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup
  “ Regenerate the environment:
 Haiti is blessed with a year round growing season and plentiful rain that many countries can 
only envy. Urban and rural areas alike could be green, providing more food, more wood, more 
shade, cleaner air, stabilising hillsides, securing watersheds. Significant water needs could be met by 
managing rainwater. A greener Haiti will reduce vulnerability to natural hazards and make the 
country more resilient. A greener Haiti needs political will and ambitious programmes. Can we find 
carbon tax investment to plant 10 million trees, one for everyone in the country, one by everyone in 
the country?”
                                                     Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti 
s 7ILL REQUIRE CONTINUAL lNANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI BY
International Donors
s 7ILL BENElT FROM TECHNICAL SUPPORT FROM )NTERNATIONAL &INANCE )NSTITUTIONS
s 7ILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE 'OVERNMENT OF (AITI
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7.  SUMMARY: THE VISION FOR RECONSTRUCTION
 For effective reconstruction to occur in Haiti, to reach the stage of Scenario 4 ‘Development 
Recovery’ (see item 2) the following are needed:
1.  an effective organisational structure within Government;
2.  leadership in Government with a ‘champion(s)’ to inspire the entire enterprise and provide 
a public face’ for reconstruction;
3.  sustained cross-party political support;
4.  survivor involvement and acceptance; 
5.  adequate funding, with controls in place to avoid corruption;
6.  long-term commitment by all supporting groups, to cover both the short-term period 
when families remain in camps, and to cover long-term rebuilding;
7.  technical competence in key fields: architecture/ planning/ engineering/ contract 
management/ low-income settlement upgrading/ regulatory environment/ environmental 
planning/ legal concerns; 
8. ‘building back better’ with disaster resistant construction, technology and siting ; 
9.  land and property tenure issues resolved and communicated to land owners and house 
owners; 
10.  adaptable, climatically and culturally appropriate shelter designs; 
11.  support from civil society: (locally based institutions/ academia/ religious bodies/ 
chambers of commerce/ private sector/ a free press )
12.  environmentally sustainable;
13.  a recovery strategy that strengthens the livelihoods of survivors and that builds the 
community’s economic base. 
FINALLY….
The twelve ‘actions needed’ in item 6 and the thirteen ‘essentials’  listed above are an exceedingly tough 
agenda.  They would be demanding within a wealthy country, let alone in one as poor as Haiti.  This 
is a reminder that all disaster recovery situations are beset by severe problems. But Haiti seems to 
have the full range in abundance, and more….political/ social/ educational/ ethical/ legal/ technical/ 
technological/ environmental/ economic/ financial/ developmental/ governmental/ staffing/ tactical/ 
strategic etc. 
But the situation is far from hopeless, there is a tremendous resilience within the population and the 
determination of so many people in the large community of ‘assisting groups’ to make recovery ‘work 
well’, and in the process build a stronger and better Haiti.  Thus the need is for visionaries….
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“ A visionary - regards difficult situations, 
not just as problems to solve, but as 
opportunities for creation and collaboration. 
To present a challenge that calls forth the 
best in people and brings them together 
around a shared sense of purpose, leading 
to a united community aligned around an 
inspiring goal.”     
Anon

